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1. 
' STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from a challenge to the Fourth Judicial District's Bail Bond 
Guidelines ("BBG"). The Fourth Judicial District appeals from the District Court's 
holding that certain provisions of the BBG promulgated by the Administrative District 
Judge ("ADJ") exceeded the ADJ's authority. 
11. 
FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In April 2004, the Fourth Judicial District ADJ adopted the BBG for the Fourth 
Judicial District. R., Vol. 11, p.267.' Judge Williamson explained in an affidavit that the 
"Bail Bond Guidelines have been adopted for many years by the Fourth Judicial District 
via order of the administrative district judge pursuant to I.C. 5 1-907. . . The 
Administrative Order signed by me on April 16, 2004, is basically a compilation of the 
Guidelines adopted by past administrative district judges. Along with reducing all the 
' The AD3 subsequently modified the Guidelines on July 16,2004, August 25,2004, October 1, 2004, December 9, 
2005, October 17,2006, and November 13, 2006. R., Vol. 11, p.267. The BBG were amended again on August 22, 
2008 while the case underlying this appeal was pending in district court. Aladdin, like all interested parties, had an 
opportunity to provide input and comment on the proposed amendments. R., Exhibit 38, Amended @davit of 
Dada S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge of the 4" ~udicial District, filed September 8, 2008, p. 2 at 7 2. 
After the District Court issued its decision in this case on March 31, 2009, the Guidelines were further amended on 
April 29, 2009 to conform to the District Court's decision, with an amendment to Section 17 on May 5, 2009. R., 
Vol. 111, pp. 520-521. 
Because the April 29, 2009 conforming guidelines had the potential to moot issues on appeal, the ADJ issued an 
administrative order on May 29, 2009, suspending the implementation of the Guidelines until this Court issued its 
decision. See R., Vol. 111, p. 566, but note: the Motion to lnclude the May 29, 2009 Administrative Order on Appeal 
was never ruled on by the Districl Court. 
The BBG at issue in this appeal, therefore, are the August 22, 2008 Guidelines. 
guidelines into one package, I merely edited, modified, made some additions and 
incorporated a table of contents for easier accessibility." R., Exhibit 14, Afldavit of 
Darla S. Williamson In Support Of State Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Summary Judgment, filed August 14,2007, at tj  2. 
The BBG apply to bail agents who do business in the Fourth Judicial District. Bail 
agents agree to abide by the Guidelines in order to be placed on the district's list of 
approved bail agents. Bail agents who are not on the list may not write bonds in the 
Fourth Judicial District. Among other things, the BBG provide criteria that a bail agent 
must meet to write bonds in the Fourth Judicial District. For example, the BBG require 
that, to write bonds in the Fourth Judicial District, a bail agent must: (1) possess and 
maintain a license with the Idaho Department of Insurance, (2) have a criminal history 
records fingerprint check completed by the Idaho State Police Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, (3) complete an application to be submitted to the TCA's office, (4) 
provide the TCA's office with a copy of the current contract between the bail agent and 
the represented insurance company andlor a current copy of the contract between the bail 
agent and the supervising agent, and ( 5 )  be appointed by the Department of Insurance to 
post bonds on behalf of the insurance company listed on the application. R., Vol. 11, 
p. 357. 
To remain on the List of Authorized Bail Agents, a bail agent must (1) have a 
criminal records fingerprint check and provide the results to the TCA's office prior to the 
bail agent's license expiring, (2) submit a copy of the bail agent's renewed Department of 
Insurance license to the TCA's office, and (3) provide the TCA's office with a current 
copy of the contract between the bail agent and the represented insurance company. 
R., Vol. 11, p. 35 1. 
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A bail agent may be disqualified from offering bonds for acceptance in the Fourth 
Judicial district for the following reasons: (1) the criminal history check reveals a felony; 
a misdemeanor involving theft, fraud or any other crime of dishonesty in the past 10 
years, including crimes committed before age 18; three or more misdemeanor crimes; or 
any combination of three or more of the following: failure to appear, contempt of court, 
or probation violation within the past 5 years; (2) the applicant failed to disclose 
information requested on the application; (3) the applicant or the applicant's insurance 
company is not licensed by the Department of Insurance; (4) the applicant has four or 
more prior violations of the BBG andlor previous Fourth Judicial District policies which 
have not been excused by the ADJ following a hearing; (5) the applicant is currently 
employed by the state or county in a court-related position; (6) the applicant was denied 
the ability to offer bail bonds for acceptance or was removed from the list of authorized 
bail agents in this or another jurisdiction; (7) the application processing revealed that the 
applicant had previously had a license suspension or revocation imposed by the 
Department of Insurance or any state of the U.S.; (8) the applicant or hislher insurance 
company has previously failed to pay a forfeited bond; (9) the applicant is related by 
blood, marriage or adoption to a Fourth District Judge; (10) the applicant or hisiher 
insurance company is financially insolvent; (1 1) the applicant has not satisfied all 
obligations to any court incurred while working with another bail agency; (12) the 
applicant was previously removed froin the list of authorized agents. R., Vol. 11, 
p. 358-59. 
Under the BBG, applicants who are denied a place on the approved list have a 
right to a hearing before the Administrative District Judge on the denial. If an applicant 
is denied a place on the list of approved agents, the applicant will be notified by the Trial 
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Court Administrator's Office in writing. R., Vol. 11, p. 359. If the applicant disagrees 
with the decision, the applicant may request a hearing before the Fourth District 
Administrative Judge to show why the applicant should be allowed to write bonds in the 
Fourth Judicial District. Id. 
Under the BBG, all bail agents who are removed from the list have a right to a 
hearing before the Administrative District Judge on the removal. In almost all cases, this 
hearing will occur before the agent is removed from the list. R., Vol. 11, pp. 362-63. 
There are three circumstances in which a bail agent may be temporarily removed without 
a pre-removal hearing: (1) the agent's license is suspended or revoked by the Department 
of Insurance; (2) the bailibond agent writes a check with insufficient funds, and (3) the 
bailbond agent's supervisor and/or insurance surety requests that the agent be removed 
from the list. If a bail agent is removed without prior notice, the bail agent has the ability 
to petition for an immediate hearing to address the reasons for removal. R., Vol. 11, 
p. 365; Exhibit 14, Afldavit of Darla Williamson in Support of State Defendants' 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 17 12, 16. 
In April 2007, Two Jinn d/b/a Aladdin Bail Bonds ("Aladdin") and two of its bail 
agents filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Fourth Judicial District, 
challenging the constitutionality of the Guidelines because the Guidelines interfered with 
Aladdin's ability to assign any bail agent of its own choosing to write bail in the Fourth 
Judicial District, regardless of whether that agent could comply with the Fourth District's 
requirements; in Aladdin's words, the Guidelines "interfere with Aladdin's ability to 
operate its business, which it does through its bail agent employees." R., Exhibit 22, 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction, Or, Alternatively, For Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, 
filed August 2 1,2008, p. 2. 
Aladdin requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the Fourth Judicial District 
from enforcing the Guidelines, and Aladdin moved to "augment the record" on its motion 
for preliminary injunction. Although the augmentation essentially added another bail 
agent as a plaintiff to the case, the motion was granted by the district court three days 
after it was filed, without any input from the Fourth District Defendants. However, the 
District Court ultimately denied Aladdin's motion for a preliminary injunction. 
In February 2008, Aladdin filed an Amended Complaint, in which bail agent 
Shantara Carlock replaced bail agent Rebecca Salinas as a plaintiff. The parties 
subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment, in which Aladdin prevailed and 
the Fourth District lost. The District Court held that the BBG for the Fourth Judicial 
District: 
exceed the authority of the ADJ to adopt procedural guidelines by: 
ignoring the agency relationship between a bail agent and the surety or bail 
agency; imposing bail agent qualification standards greater than those 
imposed by the Idaho Department of Insurance (hereinafter "DOI"), except 
as they relate to a bail agent's family relationship to a Fourth Judicial 
District judge or a bail agent's simultaneous employment in a court-related 
position; requiring bail agents to ensure that a forfeited bond is paid; and 
providing sanctions for a bail agent's failure to pay a forfeited bond. 
R., Vol. 111, p. 492-493. 
As a consequence of the District Court's holding, the Fourth District must: 
Transact bail bond business with convicted felons 
Transact bail bond business with bail agents who have been removed from 
authorized lists in other jurisdictions in Idaho 
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Transact bail bond business with agents who have previously lost their licenses 
in other states 
Under the District Court's holding, the Fourth District may require individual bail 
agents to submit to a criminal background check; however, if the background check 
discloses new misdemeanor or felony convictions - even a conviction arising from work 
as a bail agent - the Fourth Judicial District has no authority to remove the bail agent's 
name from the list. Under the District Court's holding, the only remaining grounds for 
preventing a bail agent from working in the Fourth District, i.e. not placing an agent's 
name on the list in the first instance, are: 
The bail agent is not licensed by the Department of Insurance ("DOI") 
The bail agent is employed in the Fourth District Court or related by blood or 
marriage to a Fourth District Judge 
The bail agent failed to disclose necessary information on hisiher application 
note: the District Court held that 9 of the 10 questions posed on the (- 
application were impermissible; thus, in light of this holding, the only 
information that a bail agent could fail to disclose would be contact 
information and whether the bail agent is employed by the Fourth Judicial 
District courts) 
With the District Court's decision in this case, the Fourth Judicial District's BBGs 
were effectively enjoined. The Fourth District filed a timely notice of appeal, and 
Aladdin filed a timely notice of cross-appeal. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL - 6 
ISSUES 
1. Do the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District exceed the authority 
of the Administrative District Judge to establish guidelines regarding posting, 
forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters relating to bonds? 
2. Do the Bail Bond Guidelines constitute a judicial exercise of legislative authority 
in violation of the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers doctrine? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District Are Within the 
Authority of the Administrative District Judge Based on the 2005 Order of 
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Inherent Authority of Courts to Regulate 
Matters Pertaining to Bail 
1. Introduction 
The authority for the Fourth Judicial District's BBG comes from (1) the 2005 
Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, which gave judicial districts the authority to 
approveldisapprove individual bail agents writing bonds in their districts andlor (2) the 
inherent authority of the courts to regulate matters relating to bail. 
The District Court's holding that BBG may not regulate individual bail agents is 
based on the incorrect assumption that the agency relationship between a bail agent and 
the agent's surety trumps both the ADJ's authority over matters pertaining to bail and 
judges' ability to oversee their courtrooms. Contrary to the District Court's holding, the 
judiciary and the courts are the final authority regarding what goes on in the courtroom 
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with respect to bail matters and, in particular, which bail agents may provide bail in 
Fourth Judicial District courtrooms. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court's 2005 Order Gave Administrative District 
Judges the Authority to Issue Bail Bond Guidelines like the Guidelines at 
Issue Here 
On August 4, 2005, then-Chief Justice Gerald Schroeder signed an Order of the 
Idaho Supreme Court giving the administrative district judge of each judicial district 
specific authority to: "establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, 
forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters." R., Vol. 111, pp. 625-627. 
As the plain language of the Supreme Court's order indicates, this authority is 
extremely broad with respect to bail bond guidelines. Under the direction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, administrative district judges were to establish guidelines that not only 
related to posting bail bonds, but, by the terms of the Order, related to forfeiture of bail 
bonds, exoneration of bail bonds, and all other matters related to bail bonds. 
Guidelines that require individual bail agents to comply with certain conditions to 
transact business in a particular judicial district are exactly the sort of provisions 
contemplated by the Idaho Supreme Court when it issued its 2005 Order regarding 
posting forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters regarding bail bonds. Individual bail 
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agents are involved in posting bail, forfeiture of bail, and exoneration of bail bonds.' The 
bail agents exercise their business judgment concerning who will get bail as explained by 
the D.C. Circuit: 
. . . The effect of such a system is that the professional bondsmen hold the 
keys to the jail in their pockets. They determine for whom they will act as 
a surety - who in their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the 
bondsmen's judgment, and the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's 
fees, remain in jail. The court and the commissioner are relegated to the 
relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail. 
Pannell v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 378, 320 F.2d 698,699 (1963) (concurring 
opinion.) A bail agent's character is extremely important to the work s h e  performs in the 
court system. "The critical factor in assuring that the accused returns to court at the 
appointed time is the bail agent to whom the accused is being released. It is the bail 
agent who makes contact with the accused and determines the risks of writing the bonds 
on his or her behalf." R., Exhibit 14, Aflda~~i t  of Dada S. Williamson in Support ofstate 
While the Fourth District argues that individual hail agents are involved in posting bail, forfeiture of hail, and 
exoneration of bail bonds, Aladdin contends that individual bail agents have a different role vis-A-vis the courts in 
(ransacting bail bond business: none whatsoever. This hndamental disagreement about the role of a hail agent in 
the court system appears to be the underlying source of all the legal arguments in this case. 
The Fourth District disagrees with Aladdin's position that "[blail agents provide no service to the Court, 
particularly in their capacities as individuals," Exhibit 22, Plaint~ffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, filed August 21. 2008, 
p. 13, and that "neither the bail agent nor the surety agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper 
time." Exhibit 3, Memorandum in Support of Plaint@$' Motion for Summary ./udgment,filedSeptember 5, 2008, p. 
16. Aladdin's own wehsite disagrees with the position Aladdin has taken in this lawsuit. The wehsite represents 
that "Aladdin will also assist the defendant through every step of the process and go to great lenglhs to guide them 
through the legal system to make their bail experience easy to understand and comply with," (R., Vol. Ill, p. 431) 
and that "Aladdin will walk you through the entire process and even assist in helping the client make their scheduled 
court dates." R., Vol. 111, p. 433. The District Court adopted Aladdin's view of the role of the bail agent. The 
District Court wrote that "[wlhile the rationales tendered by the ADJ might he aspirational for any poster of bail, 
whether private surety, cash or surety bond, there is nothing in the record [fn. omitted], the guidelines, or the 
statutory and case law that requires a bail agent 'to assure the accused's appearance, and . . . the duty to monitor and 
supervise the accused aRer release on hail and to recapture should he or she fail to appear." R., Vol. 111, pp. 469- 
470. 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 14, 
2007, at 6. Under the Supreme Court's order, a bail agent's activity in posting, 
forfeiting, exonerating and in all other bail-related matters is properly subject to the 
Fourth Judicial District's Guidelines. 
3. Courts Have Inherent Authority to Regulate Matters Pertaining to Bail 
State appellate courts "have traditionally asserted two- primary bases for the 
existence of inherent judicial powers - the first is the separation of powers doctrine and 
the second is that these powers are inherent in a court because of its existence in the 
governmental power scheme." Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Court, 6, (NCJ 
Press, 2008). A court's inherent authority is not derived from statutory provision, but 
from the inherent "nature and constitution of the tribunals themselves." Id., p. 8, citing 
State v. Superior Court, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (Ariz. 1954). This Court recently reiterated 
that the inherent authority of the courts is not dependent upon legislative enactments: 
"We have made it clear from time to time that the rule-making authority of the courts is 
not dependent upon legislative enactments." City of Boise v. Ada County and Board of 
Ada County Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 110, Docket No. 35432, August 25,2009, 
p. 8. 
This Court has recognized inherent judicial powers to adopt rules regarding the 
qualifications of persons seeking to practice law, to regulate law practice by issuing 
contempt citations, to apply sanctions for the failure of a party to comply with a 
discovery order, and to grant intervention to persons who may be adversely affected by 
the outcome of a proceeding or when equitable principles otherwise require. See In re 
Edwavds, 266 P. 665 (Idaho 1928), Application ofKaufmann, 69 Idaho 297,206 P.2d 528 
(1949), In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 127 P.3d 178 (Idaho 2005), State v. Stradley, 127 
Idaho 203, 899 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1995), City of Boise v. Ada County and Board of Ada 
County Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 110, Docket No. 35432, August 25, 2009, 
p. 8. As discussed below, this Court has also recognized inherent judicial powers related 
to bail. State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 538, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985). In 
Currington, this Court quoted from a Washington State Supreme Court decision which 
stated, in part, that " '[slince the inherent power to fix bail is grounded in the power to 
hold a defendant, and thus relates to the manner of ensuring that the alleged offense will 
be heard by the court, we believe it to be implicit that the right to bail is essentially 
procedural in nature."' Id. 
In deciding this case, the Court should adopt the same reasoning that it previously 
applied in Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 305, 206 P.2d 528, 536 (1949), a case 
dealing with applicants to practice in the State Bar. 
The courts are, of  course, a separate and independent division of the 
government, and, within their constitutional rights, not subject to control by 
the Legislature. Article 3, Constitution of Arizona. We think there is no 
more important duty, nor one whose performance is more necessary to the 
proper hnctioning of the courts, than to see that their officers are of proper 
mental ability and moral character. The Legislature may, and very properly 
does, provide from time to time that certain minimum qualifications shall 
be possessed by every citizen who desires to apply to the courts for 
permission to practice therein, and the courts will require all applicants to 
comply with the statute. This, however, is a limitation, not on the courts, 
but upon the individual citizen, and it in no manner can be construed as 
compelling the courts to accept as their officers all applicants who have 
passed such minimum standards, unless the courts are themselves satisfied 
that such qualifications are sufficient. If they are not, it is their inherent 
right to prescribe such other and additional conditions as may be necessary 
to satisfy them the applicants are indeed entitled to become such officers. In 
other words, they may not accept less, but may demand more, than the 
Legislature has required.' Approved in Re Cate, Cal.App., 270 P. 976, 
infra, and In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324.41 P.2d 161 at page 162: 
'The requirements of the Legislature in this particular are restrictions on the 
individual and not limitations on the courts. They cannot compel the courts 
to admit to practice a person who is not properly qualified or whose moral 
character is bad. In other words, the courts in the exercise of their inherent 
power may demand more than the Legislature has required.' 
Id. 
Following this same reasoning, the trial courts may exercise their inherent 
authority to decide which bail agents they will allow to write bail in their courtrooms. 
4. The U.S. Suoreme Court, Courts Around the Country, and the Idaho 
Suoreme Court Recognize that Courts Have Inherent Authority to Regulate 
Bail 
No less an authority than the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that it is courts, 
and not bondsmen, who should be in control of the workings of the bail system. 
Describing a commercial bail system "with all its abuses . . . in full and odorous bloom in 
Illinois," the Supreme Court wrote: 
The results [of Illinois' system] were that a heavy and irretrievable burden 
fell upon the accused, to the excellent profit of the bondsman, and that 
professional bondsman, and not the courts, exercised significant control 
ovcr the actual workings of the bail system. 
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359-360 (1972) (upholding legislation in Illinois that 
effectively abolished commercial bail in that state). 
When Kentucky upheld its own legislation abolishing commercial bail, its 
Supreme Court expressed little patience for the view that the courts were constrained to 
regulate bail bondsmen the same as any other profession: 
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The provisions of bail related to criminal defendants are governed by the 
rules of this court. To argue that the compensated surety has the same 
standing as barbers, merchants, professions and other businesses is needless 
rhetoric. 
Stephens v. Bonding Association ofKentucky, 538 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1976). 
Courts around the country have acknowledged that '"reasonable requirements 
governing and regulating professional . . . bondsmen clearly come within the inherent 
powers of the court and may be properly supervised by the court."' Calvert v. Lapeer 
Circuit Judges, 502 N.W.2d 293 (Michigan 1993) quoting In re Johnson, 217 S.E.2d 85 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (citing cases from Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Texas, the 2nd Federal Circuit, and the 1 l th Federal Circuit). 
Idaho law similarly recognizes the inherent authority of judges to govern matters 
* .  
pertaining to bail. State v. Curringfon, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 
(1985). Idaho's rules recognize this inherent authority also. 
Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 13(3) acknowledges that the administrative 
judge of a judicial district has the authority to restrict the acceptance of bail bonds 
offered. It states: 
A fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or trust company authorized to do business 
in the state of Idaho and authorized to become and be accepted as sole 
surety on undertakings and bonds may execute the written undertakings 
provided for in these rules, which may be accepted by the person receiving 
the bond without prior approval by a judge unless otherwise ordered by the 
administrative judge of the iudicial district. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 46 also recognizes the authority of the administrative district 
judge to govern matters pertaining to bail bonds. 
Provided, bail may be posted by depositing a cashier's check, money order, 
or a personal check payable to the clerk of the court under such procedures 
as shall be established by the administrative district judge, or where 
acceptance of the personal check has been approved by a magistrate or a 
district judge. 
(Emphasis added.) 
These rules reflect the understanding in place at the time Idaho's Constitution was 
ratified: it was up to the courts to determine the sufficiency of sureties. See Leader v. 
Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 639, 151 P.3d 831, 835 (2007) (noting that the statutes passed in 
1864, and in effect at the time Idaho's constitution was ratified, required courts to 
determine the sufficiency of sureties). Again, under these rules trial courts may decide 
which bail agents will operate in their courtrooms. 
5. A 1993 Michigan Supreme Court Case Explains the Inherent Authority of 
Courts to Re~ulate  Bail Bondsmen 
The case of Calvert v. Lapeer Circuit Judges, 502 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. 1993) is 
directly on point regarding courts' inherent authority to regulate bail bondsmen within 
their judicial districts. The Michigan Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals' 
decision, which had held that the insurance commissioner, rather than judges, had 
authority to remove bail bondsmen from an approved list of bail bondsmen maintained by 
the Michigan trial courts. 
In Calvert, the judges of the Lapeer Circuit Court and a district court removed 
Michael Calvert's name from the list of persons authorized to write bonds after he 
admitted charging fees and engaging in other conduct violative of Penal Code provisions. 
His suspension from the list was for 6 months. The Michigan Court of Appeals stayed 
the removal of Calvert's name from the list and held that judges did not have the 
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authority to suspend Calvert from writing bonds or to remove his name from the list. The 
Court of Appeals held that the sole responsibility for supervising the conduct of persons 
who write bonds had been vested by the Legislature in the insurance commissioner, 
referring to the fact that the Insurance Code empowered the commissioner to investigate 
the character and fitness of bail agents and to suspend or revoke licenses. 
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals. In a 
well-researched opinion, which examined both state and federal law, the Michigan 
Supreme Court explained that the Insurance Commissioner's regulatory authority under 
the insurance statutes was not intended to displace the authority of the trial courts over 
bail bond agents: 
While the insurance commissioner has the power to discipline insurance 
agents and bail bondsmen, it does not follow that the statutory provisions 
from which the disciplinary powers of the insurance commissioner derive 
were intended to occupy the whole field and to preclude judges from 
declining to accept bonds from persons who violate provisions of the law 
regulating the furnishing of bonds. 
Because we conclude that the Insurance Code does not confer on the 
insurance coinmissioner such comprehensive authority to suspend or 
revoke the license of an agent that excludes the exercise of similar power 
by judges, we do not consider or address the question whether the 
Legislature could constitutionally eliminate judicial power to suspend or 
revoke the authority of a person who writes bail bonds and who has been 
found to have done so in violation of law. 
Calverr v. Lapeer Circuit Judges, 442 Mich. 409, 412, 502 N.W. 2d 293, 294 (1993) 
(portion of footnote included in text). 
The reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court applies in this case also. While the 
DO1 has the power to license and discipline insurance agents and bail agents, it does not 
follow that Idaho's Department of Insurance statutes were intended to occupy the whole 
field and to preclude judges from disqualifying persons who violate the law in matters 
pertaining to bail bonds from writing bail bonds. 
6. Bail Agents' Lack of a Protected Propertv Interest in Doing Business in a 
Particular Judicial District Supports Courts' Inherent Authority to Regulate 
Individual Bail A~en t s  
The District Court held that the "Guidelines create an additional substantive 
licensure procedure that more than duplicates the licensure procedure provided by the 
DOI," (R., Vol. 111, p. 470), and that, under this substantive license procedure deriving 
from the Insurance Code, bail agents have a protected property interest in writing bonds 
in the Fourth Judicial District. R., Vol. 111, p. 484. However, the Guidelines do not 
create "an additional substantive license procedure" because the Fourth District has never 
attempted to license, or revoke the license of, a bail agent in the State of Idaho. 
R., Exhibit 38, Amended Affidavit of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District, Jled September 8, 2008 at 11 11-12. 
There is a difference between being licensed by the DOI, which gives an agent the 
legal right to offer to write bail bonds anywhere in Idaho, and being placed on a list of 
approved agents for a particular judicial district, which constitutes an acceptance of the 
agent to write bonds in that particular judicial district. The DO1 regulates the former 
(producer licenses authorizing the agent to offer hislher services), the Fourth District 
regulates the latter (acceptance of bail agents in the Fourth District who may bind their 
principals). While a bail agent may have a protected property interest in hislher statewide 
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license, a bail agent does have a protected property interest in compelling the Fourth 
Judicial District to do business with hiidher. 
The difference between statewide licensing of persons who may offer a service 
and district guidelines detailing the conditions for acceptance of the offer is significant 
because there is no "inherent authority" of the courts to issue producer licenses or revoke 
producer licenses. The inherent authority of the courts applies to the courts' ability to 
regulate matters pertaining to bail, which includes choosing which individual bail agents 
in a particular judicial district meet that district's needs. 
The Fourth District does not agree with, and specifically appeals, the District 
Court's legal conclusion that "a property right attaches to a bail [agent's] authorization to 
file bonds under the Guidelines." R., Vol. 11, p. 271. The courts that have addressed the 
question whether an individual has a property right or expectation in being on an 
approved list of bail agents have found that they do not? 
Baldwin v. Daniels, 250 F.3d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 2001) (no property interest implicated where 
bail agent was removed from a list of approved bail agents because her statewide license to write 
bonds was not revoked; rather, her ability to write bonds at the county jail was restricted); 
Richards v. City of Columbus, 92-7359, 1993 WL 413911 (5th Cir. October 12, 1993) 
(Unpublished) (even assuming that Richards had a protected property interest in his state-issued 
bondsman license, he did not have a property interest in his ability to write bonds in Columbus, 
Mississippi); Cf: Boyett v. Troy State Univ. at Montgomery, 971 F Supp. 1403, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 
1997) (granting summary judgment on substantive due process claim because "no evidence has 
been presented that the plaintiff has been precluded from pursuing his profession with alf 
employers"); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 71 1 F.2d 1006, 101 1 (1 1" Cir. 1983) (deprivation of 
the right to follow a chosen profession cannot be established unless the plaintiff has been banned 
from engaging in his profession with any employer); Moates v. Strength, 57 F. Supp.2d 1305 
(N.D. Alabama, 1999) (individual did not have a fundamental right to work as a private detective 
in Chilton County, Alabama). 
The case of McInTosh v. LaBundy, 161 S.W.3d 413 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) is 
analogous to this case. In McInTosh, a licensed clinical social worker sought judicial 
review of the Department of Correction's decision to deny the social worker a place on 
the list of approved sex offender therapists, despite the fact that the social worker had met 
all the DOC's requirements. The court framed the issue as: ". . . [Ujnder the facts plead in 
his petition, does McIntosh have a legal right to be placed on the approved providers 
list?" 161 S.W.3d at 416. The court answered that question in the negative after 
reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions. The court reasoned: 
In order to prevail McIntosh must show that the agency action of refusing 
to place him upon the list of approved providers treads upon a legally 
protected right or privilege. The DOC's refusal to place McIntosh on the 
Approved Providers List does not deny him to his right to work as a sex 
therapist in any general or particular sense, and he does not allege that he 
has been denied a license to practice in the field. McIntosh points to no 
rule, statute, or other authority creating a legal right or entitlement that 
he be placed on the list of approved providers. Mclntosh points to no 
provision in state law or anywhere else that creates a property interest or 
privilege in placement on the approved list. In accordance with the above 
authorities, we find that McIntosh's petition failed to state a legal claim for 
relief because he had no legal right or privilege to be included on the list of 
approved sex therapists. 
161 S.W.3d 413 at 417 (emphasis added). 
Neither the Department of Insurance license nor the Fourth District's Guidelines 
provide bail agents with a protected property interest in being placed on the list of 
approved agents or remaining on the list of approved agents. It is ultimately up to the 
Administrative District Judge to determine whether an applicant will be approved or not. 
R., Exhibit 34, Affidavit of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District, filed September 5, 2008, p. 2 at 7 4. ("In all cases, whether the 
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bail agent is initially denied a place on the approved list, or removed from the approved 
list and requesting reinstatement, it is the Administrative District Judge that has the final 
authority to determine if a bail agent is on the list.") 
The legal conclusion that bail agents have no right or entitlement to be on an 
approved list, i.e. that they lack a property interest in doing business with a particular 
judicial district, supports courts' inherent authority to decide whether to allow bail agents 
to write bail bonds before the courts. A bail agent has no protected property interest in 
compelling a particular judicial district to do business with himher; on the other hand, 
the judges' interest in regulating the bail agents who walk into the courtrooms on a daily 
basis is high.4 
B. The Bail Bond Guidelines Are Not a Judicial Exercise of a Legislative 
Function and Do Not Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
1. Introduction 
Idaho Constitution, Article 11, § 1, divides the power of state government into 
"three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial," and provides that "no 
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Article V, 5 2, 
explicitly provides that the courts in Idaho "constitute a unified and integrated judicial 
system for administration and supervision by the Supreme Court." Article V, 5 13, 
further provides that "[tlhe legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
Despite the fact that applicants and bail agents have no protected property right on being on the list, the BBG 
have, nevertheless, provided for a hearing for applicants who wish to challenge the decision not to place them on the 
list, as well as bail agents who wish to challenge the decision to remove them from the list. R. Vol. 11, pp. 359-363. 
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department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate 
department of the government." 
This Court has specifically held that the right to grant bail is a procedural right, not 
a substantive one: 
Our Constitution in art. 5, 5 13 provides in pertinent part: 
'The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly 
pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government. 
,, 
Our Legislature has recognized and confirmed the procedural rule- 
making power of the Supreme Court. I.C. §§ 1-2 12, 1-2 13. 
Our decision at bottom is whether post-conviction bail is one of 
substantive right within the prerogative of the legislature, or is rather 
a procedural consideration governed by the rules of this Court. We 
hold that as to the very narrow issue presented here, i.e., the 
authority of a trial court to allow post-conviction bail to a convicted 
criminal made ineligible for bail by a statutory enactment, the issue 
is one of procedure rather than of substantive law. . . . 
We note that, where conflict exists between statutory criminal 
provisions and the Idaho Criminal Rules in matters of procedure, the 
rules will prevail. [Citations omitted.] 
The fixing of bail and release from custody are matters traditionally 
within the discretion of the courts. [Citations omitted.] We believe 
that these matters are most wisely left to the trial judge. 
State v. Curvington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-541, 700 P.2d 942,943-944 (1985). 
The District Court held that some of the Guidelines do not violate the separation of 
powers doctrine, for example, the Guideline disqualifying bail agents who have certain 
relationships with a Fourth District judge, but that most Guidelines do violate the 
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separation of powers doctrine. R., Vol. 111, p. 470. For example, the District Court held 
that the following BBG were outside the authority of the ADJ: BBG that permit bail 
agents to be disqualified based on a felony conviction, three or more misdemeanor 
convictions, a misdemeanor involving theft, fraud or other crime of dishonesty; BBG 
that permit bail agents to be disqualified based on the bail agent being denied the ability 
to offer bail bonds or being removed from an authorized list in another jurisdiction; BBG 
that permit bail agents to be disqualified based on having their producer license 
suspended or revoked by the Department of Insurance in any U.S. state; BBG that permit 
bail agents to be disqualified based on the bail agent being previously removed from the 
list of authorized bail agents; BBG that permit bail agents to be disqualified based on a 
failure to satisfy hisiher obligations to any court incurred while working with another bail 
agency. R., Vol. 111, p. 480. 
This attempt to split the separation-of-powers baby is not well grounded in the 
law. Either the Legislature may constitutionally eliminate the judicial power to suspend 
the authority of individuals to write bail bonds in a particular judicial district or it may 
not. If the Legislature may constitutionally eliminate that judicial power, which is a 
question the District Court's holding does not address, then the question remains whether 
the Legislature, by vesting the DO1 with the authority to discipline and revoke bail 
agents' licenses, has eliminated that judicial power in this case. The District Court's 
holding does not address this question either. 
If the Idaho Legislature had vested all the authority over bail agents in the 
Department of Insurance, and if this licensing authority somehow included the authority 
to force judicial districts to use any bail agent who is licensed by the DOI, then what 
basis would the Fourth Judicial District have for drafting Guidelines for bail agents at 
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all? For example, what authority would the Fourth Judicial District have for requiring 
that a bail agent not be married to a Fourth Judicial District Judge? 
The Fourth District's requirement that bail agents who do business in the Fourth 
District Courts not be married to a Fourth District Judge is no more procedural (no less 
substantive) than the Fourth District's requirement that bail agents be in good standing in 
all other judicial districts in Idaho. Neither of these conditions is regulated by the DOI, 
and yet, the former is permissible under the District Court's holding, but the latter is 
enjoined. The District Court's separation of powers line, then, is not procedural vs. 
substantive. Nor is the line what is regulated by the DO1 vs. what is not regulated by the 
DOI. The District Court's separation of powers line is unclear and not well grounded in 
the law. 
The District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the Guidelines violate 
the separation of powers at all because such holding ignores the fact that two branches 
can co-regulate different aspects of one area without violating the Constitution. 
2. Two Branches of Government Can Regulate Different Asvects in the Same 
Area without Violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The District Court held that, "[wlhile some of the Guidelines.. .are not violative of 
the separation of powers ... the bulk of the licensure procedure 'creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights' of bail agents in violation of Idaho Const. art. 111, § 1 ." Id. This 
holding appears to have two separate bases. 
First, the District Court appears to interpret any overlap between the BBG and the 
DO1 statutes as a constitutional violation. ("The Guidelines create an additional 
substantive licensure procedure that more than duplicates the licensure procedure 
provided by the DOI." R., Vol. 111, p. 470.) This interpretation is contrary to law. The 
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licensing function (authorizing a person to hold himself out as qualified to perform the 
licensed service) is distinct from the decision whether to use the licensee's services. 
Second, the District Court interprets the BBG to make individual bail agents "co- 
sureties" on bonds by requiring that the individual bail agent make sure the bond is paid 
by the surety (insurance company). This interpretation of the BBG is contrary to the 
evidence that was presented to the District Court. 
3. That the BBG and the DO1 Statutes Both Address Bail Bond Agents Does 
Not Violate the Separation of Powers 
"In light of the many express provisions authorizing the exercise of power in one 
department by persons in another department, i t  is perhaps more accurate to say the Idaho 
Constitution embodies a blended powers principle than a separated powers principle." 
Dennis C. Colson, Divided Powers and Court Rules in the Idaho Constitution, 3 1 Idaho 
L. Rev. 461, 465-66 (1995). "The legislative, executive and judicial powers are often 
mixed, and no sharp line of distinction can be made between them. In these 
circumstances, the Constitution is offended only when the whole power of one of these 
departments is exercised by the same hands which hold the whole power of another of the 
branches." Id. at 470. 
. . . [TJhe doctrine of the separation of powers was never intended to create, 
and certainly never did create, utterly exclusive spheres of competence. 
The compartmentalization of governmental powers among the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches has never been watertight. Harmonious 
cooperation among the three branches is fundamental to our system of 
government ... The question to be asked is not whether two branches of 
government engage in coinciding activities, but rather whether the activity 
of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the 
prerogatives of another. 
Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash., en bane, 1975) (citations omitted). 
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Under the separation of powers doctrine, the question is not whether the 
Legislature and the Judiciary both engage in the activity of identifying certain persons 
who may perform as bail agents (they do), but rather whether the activity of one branch 
in this area threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another 
(it does not). 
The District Court's opinion does not consider how, if it all, the BBG activity of 
the judicial branch in the Fourth District threatens the independence or integrity or 
invades the prerogatives of the Legislature. Aladdin did not present any evidence or 
explanation, nor is there any reason to conclude, that the Legislature's lawmaking is 
threatened by the BBG. 
The BBG and the Department of Insurance statutes do not threaten the 
independence or integrity or invade the prerogatives of the other because each addresses 
different issues; thus, there is no issue with respect to the separation of powers. The 
statutory licensing scheme for the DO1 determines who meets the minimum statutory 
requirements for licensing to write bail bonds anywhere in Idaho; the Fourth District's 
BBGs determine which bail bond agents have established the practical working 
relationships with the Fourth District that the ADJ requires to have confidence in their 
work. 
To use an imperfect but nevertheless useful analogy, the DO1 statutes for bail 
agents are analogous to those for health insurers; the Fourth District BBG's are analogous 
to the Department of Administration's requirements to bid upon the contract to provide 
health insurance for State employees. A license qualifying one to offer bail bonds or 
health insurance to the State does not guarantee that the State must purchase one's 
services. 
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4. Individual Bail Agents Are Not Co-sureties as Intemreted by the District 
court 
The District Court wrote that the "substantive change of the bail agent's status 
from that of an agent of a disclosed principal to that of a principal has led to most of the 
problems facing the parties in this litigation." R., Vol. 111, p. 476. The District Court 
noted that the BBG required an individual bail agent to: 
ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the right of the 
state or county to pursue collection of a forfeited bond from the insurance 
company, and notwithstanding any agreement between the bail agent and 
the insurance company. 
If a bail agent does not comply with this requirement under the Guidelines, the 
bail agent can be removed from the approved list of agents. The District Court held that 
this requirement - to ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid at the risk of being 
removed from the approved list - transforms a bail agent from an agent to a disclosed 
principal, thus creating, defining and regulating primary rights of bail agents in violation 
of Idaho Const. art. 111, § 1. 
However, the District Court's holding is contrary to the evidence that was 
presented to the Court. Judge Williamson's affidavit stated that: 
2. I am familiar with the Bail Bond Guidelines for the 4" Judicial District. 
The Bail Bond Guidelines do not make an individual bail agent a "co- 
surety" on a bond. 
3. I am not aware of any time that an individual bail agent has ever been made 
personally financially liable for the payment of a bond under the 
Guidelines. 
4. The Guidelines are not intended to make individual bail agents co-sureties 
on a bond and I have never interpreted them to do so or applied them in this 
manner. I know the intent behind the language in the Guidelines because I 
was the individual with the responsibility to approve and adopt the 
guidelines by administrative order. I also had the primary responsibility in 
drafting the current Guidelines. 
5. The language referring to the bail agent as 'the responsible party to ensure 
that a forfeited bond is timely paid,' is not intended to make the individual 
bail agent financially responsible for the payment of the bond. It means 
that the bail agent is the individual whose job is to facilitate the payment of 
the bond from the surety or other responsible entity. 
R., Exhibit 19, Afidavit of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, filed July 
10, 2008. 
The District Court should have deferred to Judge Williamson's interpretation of 
the BBGs because she was the authority who issued them.' The evidence before the 
~ i s t r i c t  Court was that individual bail agents are co-sureties on bonds. Individual 
bail agents have never been made personally financially liable for the payment of a bond 
under the Guidelines. It is true that agents are held "responsible" for bonds being paid, in 
the sense that bail agents are removed from the approved list when the bonds they signed 
It is a principle of Idaho law that when a statute or rule is ambiguous the District Court and the Supreme Court 
will defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of the statute or rule: 
Interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free review. In Re 
Estate of Elliott, 141 ldaho 177, 181, 108 P.3d 324, 328 (2005). Administrative regulations are 
subject to the same principles of statutory conshuction as statutes. Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 
ldaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). An agency's interpretation of its statutes is entitled to 
deference if (1) the agency is entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute in question, 
(2) the agency's statutory construction is reasonable, (3) the statutory language does not treat the 
precise issue, and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. Pearl v. 
Board of Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho 107, 113,44 P.3d 1162, 1 I68 (2002). 
Stafford v. ldaho Depf, ofHealth & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 533, 181 P.3d 456, 459 (2008). That rationale should 
be no different when the ADJ has promulgated a guideline. In this case, all four factors also apply to Judge 
Wiliiamson's performance of her duties as an ADJ: (I)  she has responsibility to administer bail bond matters and to 
promulgate guidelines, (2) her construction is reasonable, (3) the language of the guidelines does not heat the 
precise issue, and (4) there are at least two rationales supporting deference: The guidelines provide a practical 
interpretation for the ADJ's responsibilities and the ADJ's expertise informs the intepretation. See Canty v. ldaho 
State Tar Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 184, 59 P.3d 983, 989 (2002), for a listing of the five rationales that may support 
deference. 
for are not paid by the surety; however, the courts have inherent authority to demand this 
level of accountability from agents who transact business on bail bonds. If courts lacked 
this authority, unscrupulous bail agents could easily run amok, writing one bad bond after 
another (bonds that the surety does not pay), and leaving the courts/counties/cities 
holding the bill. If courts lacked this authority, unscrupulous bail agents could take 
advantage of criminal defendants as well. 
The Fourth District argued to the District Court in this case that courts have 
inherent authority to govern matters related to bail. In support of this argument, the 
Fourth District relied on Idaho's Rules and Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
The District Court rejected the Fourth District's reliance on Idaho law, but adopted 
Aladdin's argument relying on a 3 page, 1977 Montana Supreme Court decision, and 
agreed with Aladdin that the courts are compelled to do business with any bail agent 
licensed by the DOI. The District Court summarized the parties' positions in its 2/6/09 
Opinion: 
Bail Plaintiffs contend that such state licensure [by the DO11 vest[s] bail 
agents with rights that cannot be superseded by the Guidelines adopted by 
the ADJ. See Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 570 P.2d 301 (Mont. 1977). 
The State Defendants take the position that it is the long recognized general 
rule that the '[flixing of bail and release from custody are matters 
traditionally with the discretion of the courts. We believe that these matters 
are most wisely left to the trial judge,' State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 53, 901 
P.3d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985); State v. Kerrigan, 98 Idaho 701, 571 P.2d 762 
(1977); State v. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784 (1969); State v. Dunn, 
91 Idaho 870, 434 P.3d 88 (1967) and that this discretion also extends to 
the approval of the bail agents who post bail bonds as agents of the surety. 
R., Vol. 111, p. 465. The Fourth District respectfully disagrees with the District Court's 
conclusion that courts lack the inherent authority to hold bail agents responsible for 
ensuring that the surety pays forfeited bonds and that the ADJ's attempt to do so makes a 
bail agent a co-surety on a bond. This conclusion is contrary to the law and the evidence 
presented to the District Court. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants pray that the Court reverse and remand the District Court's decision 
holding that the Fourth District's Bail Bond Guidelines violate the Constitution and direct 
the District Court to issue a declaratory judgment in favor of Defendants that the Fourth 
Judicial District's Bail Bond Guidelines do not violate any of Plaintiffs' constitutional or 
statutory rights. 
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